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Abstract
An essential primitive for an efficient research ecosystem is partial-progress sharing (PPS) – whereby a
researcher shares information immediately upon making a breakthrough. This helps prevent duplication
of work; however there is evidence that existing reward structures in research discourage partial-progress
sharing. Ensuring PPS is especially important for new online collaborative-research platforms, which
involve many researchers working on large, multi-stage problems.
We study the problem of incentivizing information-sharing in research, under a stylized model: non-
identical agents work independently on subtasks of a large project, with dependencies between subtasks
captured via an acyclic subtask-network. Each subtask carries a reward, given to the first agent who
publicly shares its solution. Agents can choose which subtasks to work on, and more importantly, when
to reveal solutions to completed subtasks. Under this model, we uncover the strategic rationale behind
certain anecdotal phenomena. Moreover, for any acyclic subtask-network, and under a general model of
agent-subtask completion times, we give sufficient conditions that ensure PPS is incentive-compatible for
all agents.
One surprising finding is that rewards which are approximately proportional to perceived task-
difficulties are sufficient to ensure PPS in all acyclic subtask-networks. The fact that there is no tension
between local fairness and global information-sharing in multi-stage projects is encouraging, as it sug-
gests practical mechanisms for real-world settings. Finally, we show that PPS is necessary, and in many
cases, sufficient, to ensure a high rate of progress in research.
1 Introduction
Academic research has changed greatly since the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society were first
published in 1665. However, the process of disseminating research has remained largely unchanged, until very
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recently. In particular, journal publications have remained to a large extent the dominant mode of research
dissemination. However, there is growing belief among researchers that existing systems are inefficient
in promoting collaboration and open information-sharing among researchers [16]. This is evident in the
increasing use of platforms such as ArXiv, StackExchange, the Polymath project, etc., for collaboration and
research dissemination [15].
Open information sharing in research reduces inefficiencies due to researchers duplicating each other’s
work. A researcher who has made a breakthrough in a part of a large problem can help speed up the overall
rate of research by sharing this partial-progress – however withholding this information is often in her self-
interest. Partial-progress sharing forms the basis of new online platforms for collaborative research like the
Polymath project [10], where mathematicians work on open problems with discussions occurring online in
full public view. Polymath and similar platforms, though successful, are currently small, and participants
often do not receive any formal credit for their contributions. However mechanisms for allocating credit for
partial-progress are increasingly being recognized as an important primitive for scaling such systems. For
example, the results of the first polymath were published under a generic pseudonym – subsequently, the
Polymath wiki started publishing details regarding individual contributions, with grant acknowledgements.
Incentivizing partial-progress sharing in research forms the backdrop for our work in this paper. In
particular, we formally justify the following assertions.
• Partial-progress sharing is critical for achieving the optimal rate of progress in projects with many
researchers.
• It is possible to make partial-progress sharing incentive-compatible for all researchers by carefully de-
signing the rewards on the subtasks of a large project.
Though these assertions appear intuitive, there are few formal ways of reasoning about them. We develop a
model of research dynamics with which we can study these questions.
1.1 A Model for Strategic Behavior in Collaborative Projects
We develop a stylized model for dynamics and information-sharing in research. For brevity, we refer to it as
the Treasure-hunt game, as it is reminiscent of a treasure-hunt where agents solve a series of clues towards
some final objective, and solving certain sets of clues ‘unlocks’ new clues.
We consider n non-identical agents working on a large project, subdivided into m inter-dependent sub-
tasks. The dependencies between subtasks are captured via a subtask-network – a directed acyclic graph,
where edges represent subtasks. A subtask u becomes available to an agent once she knows the solution to
all the predecessor subtasks – those from which subtask u is reachable in the subtask-network. The entire
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project is completed once all subtasks are solved.
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(b) More complex acyclic subtask-network
Figure 1: Examples of the Treasure-Hunt game: (a) Linear subtask-network – Agent 1 has solved (but not
shared) subtask u and can start subtask v. The rest must first finish subtask u. (b) More complex acyclic
subtask-network. Solid subtasks (a, b) are completed, while green subtasks (c, d, e) are available for solving.
For example, a project consisting of subtasks arranged in a line requires agents to execute the subtasks
in order starting from the first, and moving to the next subtask only after completing the preceding one. On
the other hand, a network consisting of two nodes with parallel edges between them represents a project with
complementary subtasks – each can be solved independently, but all subtasks need to be solved to complete
the project. More examples are given in figure 1.
We assume that agents work on subtasks independently. If agent i focusses her complete attention on
subtask u, then she solves it after a random time interval, drawn from an exponential distribution Exp(ai(u))
– the rate parameter ai(u) corresponds to the aptitude of agent i for task u. While most of our results are
derived for a general aptitude matrix, we obtain sharper results in the case of separable-aptitudes (SA):
Definition 1 (Separable-Aptitudes (SA) Model). The agent-task aptitudes decompose as ai(u) = ai ·su,
where:
• ai is the innate ability of agent i, which is independent of the tasks.
• su is the simplicity of task u, which is independent of the agents.
We assume that agents know the complete aptitude matrix – however, as we discuss later, our results hold
under much weaker assumptions. If an agent has more than one subtask available for solving, then we assume
she can split her effort between them.
Subtasks are associated with rewards, given to the first agent to publicly share its solution – this captures
the standard norm in academia, sometimes referred to as the Priority Rule [17]. We assume that the rewards
are fixed exogenously.
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Upon solving a subtask, an agent can choose when to share the solution. Sharing without delay helps
speed up the overall rate of research; we formalize this as follows:
Definition 2 (Partial-Progress Sharing (PPS) Policy). An agent i is said to follow the partial-progress
sharing policy if, upon solving a subtask, she immediately shares the solution with all other agents.
Agents can alternately defer sharing solutions to an arbitrary future time, and continue working on down-
stream subtasks, while others remain stuck behind. For example, an agent may choose to share her partial-
progress after a fixed delay, or until she solves the next subtask and can claim rewards for multiple subtasks
together.
The Treasure-hunt game captures the strategic behavior of agents with respect to sharing information.
The strategy space of agents in the game consists of: (i) the delay in announcing the solution to a subtask,
and (ii) choice of subtask when multiple are available. On the other hand, for the social planner, there are
two natural objectives:
1. To ensure partial-progress sharing – choosing reward-vectors in a way that agents are incentivized to
publicly share solutions without any delay.
2. To minimize the makespan – ensuring the project is completed in the least time.
1.2 Two Warmup Examples
To understand the above objectives, we first present two examples. Our first objective is to allocate rewards
to incentivize PPS – the following example shows that even in simple subtask-network, the rewards affect
agent strategies in a non-trivial way:
Example 1. Given a linear subtask-network under the SA model, with two subtasks {p, q} (p preceding q)
with simplicities {2s, s}, and two agents {1, 2} with abilities {a, a}. If the rewards satisfy 4Rp > Rq, then
for both agents, following PPS is a dominant strategy. Else, if the rewards satisfy 4Rp < Rq, then for both
agents withholding partial-progress is a dominant strategy.
Proof. Suppose the strategy space of an agent i is Si = {P, P}, where P corresponds to agent i following
PPS, and P to agent i sharing solutions only after solving both tasks1. For each (x, y) ∈ S1×S2, let U is1,s2 to
be the payoff to agent i ∈ {1, 2} with agent 1 opting for strategy s1 and agent 2 opting for s2. By symmetry
(because both agents are identical), we have U1P,P = U
2
P,P = U
1
P,P
= U2
P
, U1
P,P
= U2
P,P
and U1
P,P
= U2
P,P
.
Further, since it is a constant sum game with total reward Rp +Rq, we have: U
1
P,P +U
2
P,P = U
1
P,P
+U2
P,P
=
1Though sufficient for this example, we note that this is a simplified strategy space – more generally, after solving an open
subtask, an agent can choose to share the solution after any arbitrary delay.
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U1
P,P
+ U2
P,P
= U1
P,P
+ U2
P,P
= Rp +Rq. Furthermore, considering the strategy profile (P , P ), we have:
U1
P,P
= P [1 solves p first] · P [1 solves q before 2 claims p|1 solved p first] · (Rp +Rq)
+ P [1 solves p first] · P [2 claims p before 1 solves q|1 solved p first] ·
(
Rq
2
)
+ P [2 solves p first] ·
(
Rq
2
)
=
1
2
· sa
sa+ 2sa
· (Rp +Rq) + 2sa
sa+ 2sa
· Rq
2
+
1
2
· Rq
2
=
2Rp + 7Rq
12
.
Now we have
2Rp+7Rq
12 >
Rp+Rq
2 ⇐⇒ 4Rp < Rq: thus, if 4Rp < Rq, then U1P,P > U1P,P , and by
symmetry, U2
P,P
> U2P,P . Further, since it is a constant sum game, the latter inequality implies U
1
P,P
< U1
P,P
(and U2
P,P
< U2
P,P
). Thus P , a non-PPS strategy, is a dominant strategy for both players On the other
hand, if 4Rp > Rq, a similar argument shows that PPS is a dominant strategy for both players.
Thus, it is non-trivial to ensure PPS. On the other hand, the following example suggests it is necessary
for efficient research, by showing that the makespan in the absence of PPS can be greater by a factor
proportional to the number of agents:
Example 2. Consider a treasure-hunt game under the SA model on a linear subtask network, with m ∼
Ω(log n) subtasks, each with simplicity 1, being attempted by n agents, each having ability 1. Suppose all
agents agree to follow PPS – then, the expected makespan is E[TPPS ] = m/n.
On the other hand, suppose the rewards are distributed so that all subtasks have a reward of 0, except
the last subtask which has a reward of 1 – it is easy to see that withholding partial-progress is a dominant-
strategy for all agents in this case. Further, the makespan is given by TNon−PPS = mini∈[n]
{∑
u∈[m] Ti(u)
}
,
where Ti(u) ∼ Exp(1). Since m = Ω(log n), via a standard Chernoff bound, we have that for all agents,∑
u∈[m] Ti(u) = Ω(m) with high probability – thus we have that E[TNon−PPS ] = Ω(m).
Taken together, the examples raise the following two questions: Can one design subtask rewards to
ensure PPS under general aptitude matrices and acyclic subgraphs? Is ensuring PPS sufficient to minimize
makespan in different settings? Our work provides answers to both these questions.
1.3 Overview of our Results
For ease of exposition, we will summarize our results here using under the SA model. Extensions to the
general aptitudes model will be made clearer in the following sections.
The Treasure-Hunt Game on a Line: We first focus on the special case of a linear subtask-network (see
figure 1(a)). At any time, each agent has only one available subtask; upon solving it, she is free to choose
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when and with whom to share the solution. In this setting, we have the following result:
Main Result 1. On linear subtask-networks under the SA model, suppose rewards {Rt} satisfy the following
condition – for every pair of subtasks (u, v) s.t. u precedes v:
Rusu
Rvsv
≥ α,
where α = maxi∈[n]
{
ai/
∑
j∈[n] aj
}
. Then PPS is a (subgame perfect) Nash Equilibrium.
Some comments and extensions (for details, refer Section 2.3):
• Sufficient condition for general aptitude matrix: The above result follows from more general conditions
that ensure PPS under any aptitude matrix (Theorem 2.1). However, under the SA model, the condition
admits the following nice interpretation:
• The Proportional-Allocation Mechanism: Under the SA model, for any agent, the ratio of expected
completion times for any two tasks is inversely proportional to their simplicities. Thus, a natural
‘locally-fair’ mechanism is to set subtask rewards to be inversely proportional to their simplicity – the
above result shows that this surprisingly also ensures global information sharing.
• Approximate Proportional-Allocation: Moreover, the above result shows that PPS is incentive com-
patible even under approximate proportional-allocation – as long as rewards for earlier subtasks are at
least an α fraction of rewards for later subtasks. Note that α corresponds to the fraction of the total
ability possessed by the best agent – in particular, α < 1.
• PPS payoffs in the core: Our results extend to transferable-utility cooperative settings, where agents
can form groups – in particular, we get conditions for ensuring that the vector of payoffs from PPS
is in the core (Theorem 2.2). Moreover, the modified conditions admit the proportional-allocation
mechanism under the SA model (Corollary 2).
• Uniqueness of equilibrium with Stackelberg agents: Finally, we modify the above result to show that
following PPS can be shown to be the unique Nash Equilibrium by admitting Stackelberg strategies –
wherein a group of agents ex-ante commit to following PPS (Corollary 3). In particular, we show that
a sufficient condition for uniqueness is that for any task, the Stackelberg agents together dominate any
other individual agent. For a generalization to the general aptitudes model, see Theorem 6.1 in Section
6.
The Treasure-Hunt Game on Acyclic Subgraph-Networks: Analyzing the treasure-hunt game is more
complicated in general acyclic subtask-networks where, at any time, an agent may have several available
subtasks, and can split her effort between them. In particular, given available subtasks M , an agent i
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can choose subtasks according to any distribution {xi(u)}u∈M . Despite this added complexity, we obtain
extensions to our previous result for the line:
Main Result 2. On an acyclic subtask-network under the SA model, suppose rewards {Rt}t∈[m] satisfy the
following condition: for every pair of subtasks (u, v) such that v is reachable from u in the subtask-network,
we have:
Rusu ≥ Rvsv.
Then PPS is a (subgame perfect) Nash Equilibrium.
Some comments and extensions regarding this setting (see Section 3 for details):
• For general aptitudes matrix, we characterize conditions under which PPS is incentive-compatible
(Theorem 3.1).
• Unlike linear subtask-networks, we can no longer admit approximate proportional-allocation because
earlier tasks need to be weighted more – however, exact proportional allocation still incentivizes PPS.
• We again show conditions under which the vector of payoffs from PPS is in the core (Theorems 3.2,
6.2), and how to ensure that PPS is the unique equilibrium allowing for Stackelberg agents (Theorem
3.3).
• Ensuring PPS indirectly results in all agents working on the same subtask at any time. Such behavior,
referred to as herding [18], has been reported in empirical studies [4].
The Efficiency of PPS in the Treasure-Hunt Game: Finally, we explore the connections between PPS
and minimum makespan. Although PPS intuitively appears to be a pre-requisite for minimizing makespan,
this may not be true in general acyclic networks. To quantify the efficiency of PPS, we study the ratio of
the optimal makespan to that under any reward-vector which incentivizes PPS. Note that under conditions
wherein PPS is the unique equilibrium, this is a natural notion of price of anarchy (POA) for the Treasure-
Hunt game.
In linear subtask-networks, it is not hard to see that under any aptitude-matrix, ensuring PPS is necessary
and sufficient for minimizing the makespan. For a general acyclic network however, we show that the ratio
of the makespan under PPS to the optimal can be unbounded. Significantly, however, we show that the
ratio scales only in the number of tasks, and not the number of agents. Furthermore, in the case of the SA
model, we have the following result:
Main Result 3. Consider the Treasure-hunt game on any acyclic subtask-network under the SA model. Sup-
pose rewards are chosen to ensure that all agents follow PPS. Then any resulting equilibrium also minimizes
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the expected makespan.
Note that the above result does not reference details of how agents choose which subtask to solve – PPS
alone is sufficient to minimize makespan.
Interpreting our model and results: Collaboration/competition in research involves many factors –
trying to incorporate all of these in a model may make the strategy-space so complicated as to not allow
any analysis. On the other hand, with a stylized model like ours, there is a danger that some phenomena
arise due to modeling artifacts. We address this concern to some degree in Section 5, where we argue that
our qualitative results are not sensitive to our assumptions.
More significantly, our model captures the main tension behind information sharing in research – partial-
progress in a problem by one agent creates an externality in the form of information asymmetry. To promote
PPS, the reward for sharing must compensate the agent for removing this externality. Our model lets us
quantify this ‘price of information’ – in particular, we show that proportional-reward mechanisms indirectly
help ensure partial-progress sharing. We also show that PPS, while necessary, is also often sufficient, for
efficiency in large-scale research.
Our work suggests that an effective way to conduct research on a big project is to first break the project
into many small subtasks, and then award credits for subtasks proportional to their difficulty. The former
recommendation matches the evidence from the Polymath project [7, 10], which is based largely on this idea
of aggregating small contributions. The latter suggests that in order to scale such platforms, it is important
to have mechanisms for rewarding contributions. The fact that that simple mechanisms suffice to ensure
PPS also points the way to potentially having these rewards defined endogenously by the agents.
Technical Novelty: Our model, though simple, admits a rich state space and agent strategies, which
moreover affect the state transitions. Thus, a priori, it is unclear how to characterize equilibria in such
settings. Our results follow from careful induction arguments on appropriate subgames. We define a class of
subgames corresponding to nested pairs of connected subgraphs of the network. In general acyclic networks,
in addition to PPS, we also show that agents follow a herding strategy – this turns out to be crucial for
characterizing equilibria. Finally, our efficiency result under the SA model is somewhat surprising. In a
related one-shot game where agents need to choose one among a set of available tasks [13], it has been shown
that under a similar separable-aptitudes model, though there exist reward-structures achieving the social
optimum (in this case, maximizing the number of completed tasks), finding these rewards is NP-hard. In
contrast, we show that ensuring PPS alone is sufficient to minimize makespan, and give simple sufficient
conditions for the same, thus circumventing the hardness of static settings under the SA model.
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1.4 Related Work
Understanding the strategic aspects of contests has had a long history [14]. Recently, there has been a focus
on problems related to distribution of credit among researchers, such as: the impact of authorship order
on research [1]; collaboration across multiple projects under local profit-sharing rules [2]; Considering the
effect of the priority rule on agents choosing between open problems, it has been shown that redistributing
rewards can make the system more efficient [13]. Our work shares much with these works, in particular,
in the idea of engineering rewards to achieve efficiency. However, these works consider only static/one-shot
settings. Another line of work focuses on dynamics in R&D settings [19, 11]. R&D contests are modeled as
a one-dimensional race. However, dynamics of information-sharing are ignored in these models.
The information-sharing aspect of our work shares similarities with models for crowdsourcing and online
knowledge-sharing forums. There has been some work on modeling crowdsourcing platforms as all-pay
auctions [6], where agents pay a cost to participate – this however is not the case in research, where agents
derive utility only by solving open problems in their chosen field. Models for online Q&A forums, where
rewards are given to the top answers to a question, have also been studied [12, 8]. In these models, each user
has some knowledge ex-ante, and by submitting an answer later, can aggregate earlier answers. In research
however, knowledge does not exist ex ante, but is created while working on problems, as is captured in our
model. Finally, information dynamics are studied by [9] in the context of online education forums – though
differing in topic, our work shares much of their modeling philosophy.
There is also a growing body of empirical work studying open information in collaborative research.
The need for better incentive structures has been underscored in a recent empirical study on the Polymath
projects [7]. The value of open information-sharing in collaborative research has also been demonstrated,
via experiments in Topcoder contests [4, 5]. They observe that, intermediate rewards, while increasing the
efficiency of problem solving, also leads to herding – both these findings correspond to what we observe in
our models.
Outline: The remaining paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we analyze projects with linear subtask-
networks, extend these results to general acyclic subtask-networks in Section 3. Next, in Section 4, we
characterize the efficiency, with respect to the makespan, of PPS in different settings. We conclude with a
discussion in Section 5. Some theorems mentioned in the main text are laid out in Section 6.
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2 The Treasure-Hunt Game on Linear Subtask-Networks
2.1 Extensive-Form Representation of the Treasure-Hunt Game
We denote [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The treasure-hunt game on a line is defined as follows:
• Task Structure: A project is divided into a set [m] of smaller subtasks, arranged in a linear subtask-
network. Subtask u becomes available to an agent only when she knows solutions to all preceding
subtasks; the overall project is completed upon solving the final subtask. A set of n non-identical
selfish agents are committed to working on the project.
• Rewards: Subtask u has associated reward Ru ≥ 0, awarded to the first agent to publicly share its
solution. We assume that the rewards are fixed exogenously.
• System Dynamics: We assume that agents work on subtasks independently. Agent i, working alone,
solves subtask u after a delay of Ti(u) ∼ Exp(ai(u)), where we refer to ai(u) as the aptitude of agent
i for subtask u. For the special case of separable-aptitudes (see Definition 1), we have ai(u) = aisu,
where we refer to {ai}i∈[n] as the agent-ability vector, and {su}u∈[m] as the subtask-simplicity vector.
• Strategy Space: The game proceeds in continuous time – for ease of notation, we suppress the
dependence of quantities on time. If an agent i solves subtask u at some time t, then she can share
the solution with any set of agents A ⊆ [n] at any subsequent time – if the solution is shared with all
other agents, we say it is publicly shared. When agent i shares the solution to subtask u with an agent
j, then j can start solving the subtask following u.
• Information Structure: We assume all agents ex ante know the aptitude-matrix {ai(t)}i∈[n],t∈[m]
– later we show how this can be relaxed. During the game, we assume agents only know their own
progress, and what is shared with them by others.
2.2 Progress Sharing in the Treasure-Hunt Game
Our main result in this section is a sufficient condition on rewards to incentivize PPS:
Theorem 2.1. Consider the Treasure-hunt game on a linear subtask-network G, and a general agent-subtask
aptitude matrix {ai(u)}. Suppose the rewards-vector {Ru} satisfies the following: for any agent i and for
any pair of subtasks u, v such that u precedes v, the rewards satisfy:
Rua−i(u)
Rva−i(v)
≥ ai(v)
ai(v) + a−i(v)
,
where for any task w, we define a−i(w) ,
∑
j 6=i aj(w). Then for all agents, partial-progress sharing (PPS)
is a (subgame perfect) Nash Equilibrium.
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Proof. We number the subtasks from the end, with the last subtask being denoted as 1, and the first as m. Fix
an agent i ∈ [n], and assume every other agent always follows the PPS policy. We define Gik,l, 0 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ m,
to be the subgame where agent i starts at subtask k, and all other agents start at subtask l. Note that agent
i starts either at par or ahead of others – this is because we assume that all other agents follow PPS. When
k < l, agent i is ahead of the others at the start – however she has not yet revealed the solutions to her
additional subtasks. In this setting, we claim the following invariant: under the conditions specified in the
theorem, PPS is a best response for agent i in every subgame Gik,l, 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ m.
First, some preliminary definitions: given two subgames Gik,l and Gip,q, we say that Gik,l is smaller than
Gip,q if k < p OR k = p and l < q. Also, assuming the invariant is true, the expected reward earned by agent
i in subgame Gik,l is given by:
R(Gik,l) =
l∑
u=k+1
Ru +
k∑
u=1
Ru.
(
ai(u)
ai(u) + a−i(u)
)
,
where a−i(u) =
∑
j∈[n]\{i} aj(u). When k < l, we refer to the (non-empty) subtasks {l, l − 1, . . . , k + 1} as
the captive subtasks of agent i. By definition, only i knows the solutions to her starting subtasks at the start
of game Gik,l.
We prove the invariant by a joint induction on k and l. For the base case, consider the subgames Gi0,l,
which correspond to a game where i knows solutions to all subtasks – clearly following PPS (i.e., sharing the
solutions at t = 0) is a best response. Now we split the remaining subgames into two cases: k < l and k = l.
• Case i. (Gik,l, 1 ≤ k < l): Assume game Gik,l starts at t = 0, and the invariant holds for all smaller games.
If agent i follows PPS, and publicly shares her captive subtasks at t = 0, then Gik,l reduces to the smaller
subgame Gik,k. Suppose instead i chooses to defect from PPS. Let τ1 to be the first time when either agent
i solves subtask k OR some agent j 6= i solves subtask l. Via a standard property of the minimum of
independent exponential random variables, we have τ1 ∼ min{Exp(ai(k)), Exp(a−i(l)} ∼ Exp(a(i, k, l)),
where we define a(i, k, l) = ai(k) + a−i(l).
Next, we observe that it is sufficient to consider deviations from PPS of the following type: i chooses a
fixed delay τ > 0, and publicly shares the solutions to captive subtasks at time t = min{τ1, τ}. This follows
from the following argument (∗):
• Suppose τ1 < τ , and assume some agent j 6= i solves subtask l before i solves subtask k. Then agent
j immediately shares the solution to subtask l (as other agents follow PPS). This reduces the game to
Gik,l−1, wherein by our induction hypothesis, i immediately shares her remaining captive subtasks, i.e.,
{l − 1, l − 2, . . . , k + 1}.
• If τ1 < τ , but agent i solves subtask k before any other agent solves subtask l, then the game reduces
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to Gik−1,l, wherein again by our induction hypothesis, i immediately shares her captive subtasks, i.e.,
{l, l − 1, . . . , k}.
• Any randomized choice of τ can be written as a linear combination of these policies.
To complete the induction step for Gik,l, we need to show that τ = 0 is the best response for i in the game
Gik,l. Let U ik,l(τ) be the expected reward of agent i if she chooses delay τ . Also, for any subtask u, let
a(u) = ai(u) + a−i(u). Then for τ = 0, we have:
U ik,l(0) =
l∑
u=k+1
Ru +
k∑
u=1
Ru.
(
ai(u)
a(u)
)
= Rl + ∆ +
ai(k)
a(k)
.Rk +R(Gik−1,k−1),
where we define ∆ =
∑l−1
j=k+1Rj . R(Gik−1,k−1) is the expected reward earned by agent i in the sub-game
Gik−1,k−1 assuming the induction hypothesis. Next we turn to the case of τ > 0. Suppose τ1 < τ : conditioned
on this, we have that i solves subtask k before any other agent solves subtask l with probability ai(k)a(i,k,l) (from
standard properties of the exponential distribution). Now for any τ > 0, we can write:
U ik,l(τ) =P[τ1 ≥ τ ]
(
l∑
u=k+1
Ru +R(Gik,k)
)
+ P[τ1 < τ ]
(
ai(k)
a(i, k, l)
R(Gik−1,l) +
a−i(l)
a(i, k, l)
R(Gik,l−1)
)
This follows from the argument (∗) given above. Expanding the terms, we have:
U ik,l(τ) = P[τ1 ≥ τ ]
(
Rl + ∆ +
ai(k)
a(k)
Rk +R(Gik−1,k−1)
)
+ P[τ1 < τ ]
ai(k)
a(i, k, l)
(
Rl + ∆ +Rk +R(Gik−1,k−1)
)
+ P[τ1 < τ ]
a−i(l)
a(i, k, l)
(
∆ +
ai(k)
a(k)
Rk +R(Gik−1,k−1)
)
Simplifying using a(i, k, l) = ai(k) + a−i(l) and P[τ1 ≥ τ ] + P[τ1 < τ ] = 1, we get:
U ik,l(τ) =Rl
(
1− P[τ1 < τ ] a−i(l)
a(i, k, l)
)
+ ∆ +Rk
(
ai(k)
a(k)
+ P[τ1 < τ ]
a−i(k)
a(k)
.
ai(k)
a(i, k, l)
)
+R(Gik−1,k−1)
Subtracting this from our expression for U ik,l(0), we have:
U ik,l(0)− U ik,l(τ) =
P[τ1 < τ ]
a(i, k, l)
(
Rla−i(l)−Rk a−i(k)ai(k)
a(k)
)
.
Finally from the condition in Theorem 2.1, we have Rla−i(l)Rka−i(k) ≥
ai(k)
a(k) : substituting we get U
i
k,l(0)−U ik,l(τ) >
0 ∀ τ > 0. Thus setting τ = 0 maximizes expected reward.
• Case ii. (Gik,k, k > 1): Assume the invariant holds for all smaller games. In this case, note that the game
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reduces to either Gik−1,k (if i solves subtask k) or to Gik−1,k−1 (if some agent j 6= i solves subtask l). For both
these subgames, we have that PPS is a best response for i via our induction hypothesis. This completes the
induction.
Theorem 2.2. If for any coalition C ⊂ [n] and for any pair of subtasks u, v such that u precedes v, the
rewards satisfy:
Rua−C(u)
Rva−C(v)
≥ aC(v)
aC(v) + a−C(v)
,
where for any task w, we define aC(w) ,
∑
j∈C aj(w) and a−C(w) ,
∑
j /∈C aj(w), then the vector of payoffs
from the PPS policy is in the core.
Proof. Since the conditions of Theorem 2.1 are met, PPS is a Nash equilibrium. The utility of each agent i
in this equilibrium is clearly given by ui ,
∑
u∈[m]
ai(u)
ai(u)+a−i(u)
Ru.
Observe that the combined utility gained by a coalition is equivalent to that of a single player with
completion-time given by the rate parameter aS(.) =
∑
j∈S aj(.). By the condition in the theorem, for any
coalition C ⊂ [n], PPS is a best response to everyone else’s following PPS. And the payoff v(C) obtained by
C is equal to
v(C) =
∑
u∈[m]
aC(u)
aC(u) + a−C(u)
Ru =
∑
u∈[m]
∑
i∈C
ai(u)
ai(u) + a−i(u)
Ru =
∑
i∈C
ui
Note that the first scenario in Example 1 satisfies the condition of Theorem 2.1, while the second violates
it. As we have just seen, the proof of this theorem follows from a careful backward-induction argument.
Making fuller use of this idea, we can extend this theorem in many interesting ways, as we discuss next.
2.3 The SA model, and stronger equilibrium concepts:
• Approximate Proportional-Allocation in the SA model: Applying the theorem to the SA model gives
the following corollary (presented as Main Result 1 in Section 1.3):
Corollary 1. Consider the Treasure-hunt game on linear subgraph-network G under the SA model.
Suppose A ,
∑
i∈[n] ai, and αNE , maxi∈[n] aiA . Then the PPS policy is a Nash equilibrium for all
agents if the rewards-vector satisfies:
Rusu
Rvsv
≥ αNE , ∀ (u, v) s.t. u precedes v in G
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Note that under the SA model, for any agent i, the ratio of expected completion time for subtasks u
and v obeys E[Ti(u)]E[Ti(v) =
sv
su
. Thus we can reinterpret the above condition in terms of an approximate
proportional-allocation mechanism, which rewards subtasks proportional to the expected time they
take to solve. Observe also that αNE is the fraction of the total ability possessed by the top agent.
In a sense, the top agent is most likely to gain by deviating from PPS, and the rewards should be
calibrated so as to prevent this.
• PPS payoffs in the Core of Cooperative Settings: As seen in Theorem 2.2, we can derive a sufficient
condition for the vector of payoffs from PPS to be in the core: to ensure that no coalition of agents,
who share partial-progress and rewards amongst themselves, benefits by deviating from the PPS policy.
We state this result for the SA model as follows:
Corollary 2. Consider the Treasure-hunt game on linear subtask-network G, under the separable-
aptitudes model. Define A ,
∑
i∈[n] ai and αC , 1−mini∈[n] aiA . Then the vector of payoffs from the
PPS policy is in the core if the rewards-vector satisfies:
Rusu
Rvsv
≥ αC , ∀ (u, v) s.t. u precedes v in G
The corollary follows from Theorem 2.2 by observing that AαC = 1 −mini∈[n] ai corresponds to the
combined “ability” of the most powerful coalition consisting of everyone except a single agent. Note that
αNE ≤ αC < 1 – thus the vector of payoffs from an approximate proportional-allocation mechanism is
in the core, but with a stricter approximation factor.
• Stackelberg strategies: One subtle point regarding Theorem 2.1 is that the resulting equilibrium need
not be unique. For two agents, an argument similar to Example 1 can be used to show uniqueness
– this approach does not easily extend to more players. However, we can circumvent this difficulty
and find conditions under which PPS is the unique Nash equilibrium, by considering settings with
Stackelberg leaders – agents who ex ante commit to following the PPS policy. We state this here for
the SA model:
Corollary 3. Consider the Treasure-hunt game on linear subtask-network G under the SA model,
with A ,
∑
i∈[n] ai. Suppose a subset of agents S ⊆ [n] ex ante commit to PPS. Define αS =
maxi∈[n] aiaS
a−i
ai+a−i
, where aS =
∑
i∈S ai. Then PPS is the unique Nash Equilibrium if the rewards
satisfy:
Rusu
Rvsv
≥ αS , ∀ (u, v) s.t. u precedes v in G
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This follows from a more general result on general aptitudes, stated as Theorem 6.1 in Section 6).
Note that if aS ≥ ai, then αS < 1 – thus if the Stackelberg agents dominate any individual agent,
then proportional allocation results in PPS. Such behavior mirrors real-life settings, wherein when top
researchers commit to open information sharing, then many others follow suit. An example of this
can be seen in the Polymath project, where a core group of mathematicians first committed to open
discussion, and this led to others joining the project.
• Weaker Requirements on Ex Ante Knowledge: We assumed that all agents are aware of the entire
aptitude matrix. Note however that the conditions in Theorem 2.1 depend only on an agent’s own
aptitude vector, and the aggregate aptitudes of the remaining agents. In particular, in the SA model,
an agent i needs to only know αi = ai/A, the ratio of her ability to the total ability of all agents, in
order to determine if PPS is a best response or not.
On the other hand, to correctly design exogenous rewards, a social planner needs to know the sim-
plicities of all subtasks. In case these estimates are not perfect, but are within a 1 ±  factor of the
true values, then as long as  > (1 − αNE)/(1 + αNE), then proportional-allocation using the noisy
estimates still incentivizes PPS.
3 The Treasure-Hunt game on general directed acyclic graphs
In this section, we extend the results from the previous section to general acyclic subtask-networks. The
subtask-network now encodes the following dependency constraints: a subtask u with source node vu can
be attempted by an agent i only after i knows the solutions to all subtasks terminating at vu (i.e., all the
in-edges of node vu). Note that at any time, an agent may have multiple available subtasks. We assume that
agent i chooses from amongst her available subtasks M according to some strategically-chosen distribution
{xi(u)}u∈M – as a result, subtask u ∈M is solved by i in time Exp(xi(u)ai(u)). The remaining model is as
described in Section 2.1.
A technical difficulty in acyclic subtask-networks is that even assuming agents follow PPS, there is no
closed-form expression for agent’s utility in a subgame – consequently, at any intermediate stage, there is no
simple way to determine an agent’s choice of available subtask. In spite of this, we can still derive a sufficient
condition on rewards to ensure PPS – this also gives a constructive proof of existence of reward-vectors that
ensure PPS in any acyclic subtask-network.
We now introduce the following notion of a virtual reward:
Definition 3 (Virtual rewards). For any agent i ⊆ [n] and subtask u ∈ [m], the virtual-reward γi(u) is
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defined as:
γi(u) ,
Ruai(u)a−i(u)
ai(u) + a−i(u)
,
where a−i(u) =
∑
j∈S\{i} aj(u).
Using this definition, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. Consider the Treasure-hunt game on a directed acyclic subtask-network G, and a general
agent-subtask aptitude matrix {ai(u)}. Suppose the rewards-vector {Ru} satisfies the following conditions:
• (Monotonicity) There exists a total ordering ≺ on subtasks [m] such that for every agent i and pair of
subtasks u, v, we have v ≺ u ⇐⇒ γi(v) < γi(u).
• For all pairs of subtasks (u, v) such that v is reachable from u in G, we have v ≺ u.
Then the following strategies together constitute a Nash equilibrium:
• Every agent implements the PPS policy.
• At any time, if Mo ⊆ [m] is the set of available subtasks, then every agent i chooses to work on the
unique subtask u∗ = arg maxu∈Mo γi(u)
The proof of Theorem 3.1, which is provided below, is again based on a careful backward induction
argument. The induction argument, however, is more involved than in Theorem 2.1 – in particular, when
multiple subtasks are available to each agent, the utility of the subgame for an agent depends on the strategies
of all other agents. We circumvent this by observing that under the given conditions, besides following PPS,
agents also have an incentive to choose the same subtask as other agents. We henceforth use the term herding
to refer to this behavior.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. In an acyclic subtask-network, a subtask v can be solved only if an agent knows the
solutions to all subtasks corresponding to edges from which v is reachable – the set L(v) of predecessors of
v. We define the set of valid knowledge-subgraphs V , {P ⊆ [m]|v ∈ P =⇒ L(v) ⊂ P} – subtasks whose
solutions may be jointly known to agents at some time.
Finally, given that an agent knows the solution to subtasks P ∈ V, the complement P c = [m] \ P
represents the subtasks still open for the agent. We define the set S = {T ⊆ M ⊆ [m] : M c, T c ∈ V} –
essentially S contains all nested-pairs of subtask-sets, whose complements are valid knowledge-subgraphs.
For example, for a linear subtask-network, where subtasks [m] are arranged in increasing order, for any l ≤ k,
the pair of subgraphs {l + 1, . . . ,m} ⊆ {k + 1, . . . ,m} are elements of S. Recall that these were the exact
subgraphs we used for induction in Theorem 2.1 – we now do something similar over pairs of subgraphs in
S.
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Fixing agent i, we define GiM,T , (M,T ) ∈ S to be the subgame where agent i knows the solutions to
subtasks T c, while any agent j 6= i knows the solutions to subtasks M c. Note that T ⊆M , and T c \M c are
the captive subtasks of i, i.e., those which i has solved, but not publicly shared. Also, for any set M such
that M c ∈ C, we define Mo ⊆M to be the available subtasks in M .
Given this set of subgames, we claim the following invariant: under the conditions specified in the
theorem, PPS + herding is a best response for agent i in every subgame GiM,T , (M,T ) ∈ S. As in Theorem
2.1, we prove this via induction. We first partition the set S as follows: given 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ m
Sl,k , {(M,T ) ∈ S : |M | = l, |T | = k}
We abuse notation and say subgame GiM,T ∈ Sl,k if (M,T ) ∈ Sl,k – note that this corresponds to agent i
having k unsolved subtasks, while the remaining agents have l ≥ k unsolved subtasks. We can restate the
above invariant as follows – for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ m, and for all games GiM,T ∈ Sl,k, PPS + herding is a best
response for agent i.
For the base case, consider the set of subgames GiM,T ∈ S1,1, i.e., subgames where all agents have a single
open subtask. Clearly PPS + herding is a best response for i in this case. For the inductive step, fixing
(l, k), we assume the invariant is true for all smaller subgames in Sq,p where q < l and p ≤ k (i.e., agent i
has strictly less open subtasks), or, q = l and p < k (i.e., agent i has k open subtasks, but the remaining
agents have strictly less open subtasks).
Now, as in Theorem 2.1, we break the induction into two cases: (i) k < l, and (ii) k = l. Note that k < l
corresponds to subgames GiM,T with T ⊂ M – here we need to show that PPS, i.e., i sharing solutions to
captive subtasks T c \M c at t = 0, is a best response. On the other hand, in any subgame GiM,M ∈ Sk,k,
we need to show herding, i.e., i chooses to work on subtask v∗ = arg maxu∈Mo γi(u). We note that we do
not need to assume/show that i follows herding in subgame GiM,T – we show that PPS is a best response
regardless of which subtask in To that i attempts.
• Case (i) (Sl,k, 1 ≤ k < l)
Consider subgame GiM,T ∈ Sl,k. As in Theorem 2.1, the only deviation strategies consist of agent i choosing
a delay parameter τ > 0, and sharing her captive subtasks at time min{τ, τ1}, where τ1 is the time of the
first breakthrough in a subtask, either by her, or some agent j 6= i. Suppose agent i concentrates her efforts
on some subtask v ∈ To; further, from our induction hypothesis, we know any agent j 6= i concentrates on
subtask u∗ = arg maxu∈Mo γj(u) – note that this is the same subtask ∀ j 6= i.
If τ = 0 or τ < τ1, then the game reduces to GiT,T . If τ1 < τ and agent i solves subtask v first, then
by our induction assumption, agent i immediately shares her remaining subtasks and the game reduces to
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GiT−v,T−v, where we use the notation T − v = T \ {v}. Finally, if τ1 < τ and some agent j 6= i solves subtask
u∗, then again agent i follows PPS and the game reduces to GiT−u∗,T−u∗ – note though that task u∗ could
be in T c (i.e., its solution be known to agent i). For the remaining proof, the only deviation of i from PPS
we consider is τ =∞. To see why this is sufficient, note that for any τ , in sample paths where τ < τ1, agent
i shares all her captive subsets (albeit with a delay) before any agent makes an additional breakthrough.
The memoryless property of exponential random variables implies that choosing any τ <∞ only scales the
difference in utility with and without PPS, by a factor of P[τ1 < τ ]2.
As before, for subtask u we define a(u) =
∑
j aj(u), and for any pair of subtasks u,w, we define a(i, u, w) =
ai(u) + a−i(w). Now for any GiM,T ∈ Sl,k, defining U iM,T to be the expected reward earned by agent i by
following PPS, we have:
U iM,T =
∑
u∈T c\Mc
Ru +
∑
u∈T
ai(u)
a(u)
Ru.
Note also that by our induction hypothesis, this is true for any pair (P,Q) ∈ S such that P ⊆M,Q ⊂ T or
P ⊂M,Q = T .
Let U i,devM,T to be the expected payoff of agent i when she deviates from PPS by waiting till τ1 before
sharing solutions. Now if u∗ ∈ T c, we have:
U i,devM,T =
a−i(u∗)
a(i, u∗, v)
U iM−u∗,T +
ai(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
U iM,T−v
Subtracting from the expected utility under PPS, we get:
U iM,T − U i,devM,T =
a−i(u∗)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
U iM,T − U iM−u∗,T
)
+
ai(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
U iM,T − U iM,T−v
)
.
=
a−i(u∗)
a(i, u∗, v)
(Ru∗)− ai(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
a−i(v)
a(v)
Rv
)
≥ a−i(u
∗)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
ai(u
∗)
a(u∗)
Ru∗
)
− ai(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
a−i(v)
a(v)
Rv
)
=
γi(u
∗)− γi(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
.
On the other hand, if u∗ /∈ T c, we have:
U i,devM,T =
a−i(u∗)
a(i, u∗, v)
U iM−u∗,T−u∗ +
ai(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
U iM,T−v.
2This fact is somewhat non-trivial, but can be formally derived, following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 2.1 –
we omit it for the sake of brevity.
18
Again subtracting from U iM,T , we get:
U iM,T − U i,devM,T =
a−i(u∗)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
U iM,T − U iM−u∗,T−u∗
)
+
ai(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
U iM,T − U iM,T−v
)
,
=
a−i(u∗)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
ai(u
∗)
a(u∗)
Ru∗
)
− ai(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
a−i(v)
a(v)
Rv
)
=
γi(u
∗)− γi(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
.
From the induction hypothesis, we have that for all agents j 6= i, herding implies that γj(u∗) > γj(w)∀w ∈
Mo. Further, from the monotonicity condition (i.e., all agents have the same ordering on virtual rewards),
we have that γi(u
∗) > γi(w)∀w ∈ Mo. On the other hand, for any task w ∈ Mo such that v is reachable
w, then from the second condition in the theorem, we have that γi(w) ≥ γi(v). Putting these together, we
get that γi(u
∗) ≥ γi(v); plugging into the above inequalities, we get that U iM,T −U i,devM,T ≥ 0. Thus following
PPS is a best response for agent i.
• Case (ii). (Sk,k, k > 1)
Consider a subgame GiM,M ∈ Sk,k. In this case, we need to show that i follows herding, i.e., i chooses
available subtask u∗ = arg maxw∈Mo γi(w). Let U
i
M,M be the expected reward earned by i if she attempts
u∗, and U i,devM,M be her expected reward if she attempts some other subtask v ∈ Mo. Note that due to our
induction hypothesis, all other agents concentrate on u∗, and share it once they solve it. Now we have:
U iM,M − U i,devM,M =
a−i(u∗)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
U iM,M − U iM−u∗,M−u∗
)
+
ai(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
U iM,M − U iM,M−v
)
,
=
a−i(u∗)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
ai(u
∗)
a(u∗)
Ru∗
)
− ai(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
(
a−i(v)
a(v)
Rv
)
=
γi(u
∗)− γi(v)
a(i, u∗, v)
.
Since u∗ = arg maxw∈Mo γi(w), therefore herding is a best response for agent i. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3.1 can be summarized as stating that as long as virtual rewards are monotone and have the
same partial-ordering as induced by the subtask-network, then PPS + herding is a Nash equilibrium. As
with the condition in Theorem 2.1, this result may be difficult to interpret. Note however that given any
acyclic subtask-network, and any aptitudes matrix with non-zero aptitudes, it gives a constructive way to
choose {Ru} to ensure PPS. The observation that ensuring PPS may also result in herding is an interesting
outcome of our analysis – such behavior has in fact been observed in research settings, for example, such
behavior in contests with incentives for partial-progress sharing is reported in [4].
In the SA model, note that for every agent i, the virtual reward γi(u) ∝ Rusu. Thus for any rewards
that are inversely proportional to the “simplicities”, the monotonicity property is satisfied. Moreover, we
obtain the following sharper characterization of sufficient conditions for ensuring PPS:
Theorem 3.2. Consider the treasure-hunt game under the SA model, on a directed acyclic subtask-network
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with m subtasks, associated simplicities {sk}k∈M and exogenous (non-zero) rewards {Rk}k∈[m], and n agents
with associated abilities {ai}i∈[n]. If the rewards satisfy:
• v is reachable from u =⇒ Rvsv ≤ Rusu.
Then any set of strategies jointly constitute a Nash Equilibrium if:
• Every agent follows the PPS policy.
• At any time, if Mo denotes the set of open subtasks, then for any agent i, the support of her choice
distribution {xi(u)}u∈Mo is contained in arg maxu∈Mo{Rusu}.
Moreover, the resulting payoffs-vector is in the core.
Proof. Consider a valid subgame GiM,T (as discussed in Theorem 3.1). Assume everyone but agent i follows
PPS + herding – given a set Mo of available subtasks, this means that for agent j 6= i, the support of
{xj(u)}u∈M is a subset of S = arg maxu∈Mo{Rusu}.
Suppose agent i deviates by extending the support of {xj(u)}u∈M to a set V of subtasks in Mo \ S.
Define λu =
∑
j∈N/{i} xj(u)aj to be the cumulative rate contributed by everyone except agent i on each
u ∈ S, and rt = xi(t)ai to be the rate contributed by agent i on each t ∈ S ∪ V – from definition, we have:
∑
u∈S
λu =
∑
u∈S
∑
j 6=i
xj(u)aj =
∑
j 6=i
aj = a−i,
∑
u∈S
ru +
∑
v∈V
rv =
∑
u∈S∪V
xi(u)ai = ai
For brevity, we define: α ,
∑
u∈S su(ru +λu) +
∑
v∈V svrv, c , Rusu, ∀u ∈ S. Now note that in any game
GiM,T agent i’s utility U iM,T under PPS + herding is given by:
U iM,T =
∑
t∈M/T
Rt + U
i
T,T .
We first show that the value U iT,T , after allowing for mixed strategies with support in S, is the same
as the value obtained in a situation where all agents focus on the same task, i.e., U iT,T =
∑
t∈T
at
a Rt, where
a ,
∑
j∈N aj . This is definitely true for all subgames in S1,1. Assume it is true for all subgames in Sk,k,
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where 1 ≤ k < |T |. Using this, we get, from standard properties of exponential random variables:
U iT,T =
∑
u∈S
suru
α
Ru +
∑
u∈S
su(ru + λu)
α
U iT−u,T−u
=
∑
u∈S
ruc
α
+
∑
u∈S
su(ru + λu)
α
( ∑
t∈T−u
ai
a
Rt
)
=
∑
u∈S
ruc
α
+
∑
u∈S
su(ru + λu)
α
(
−au
a
Ru +
∑
t∈T
ai
a
Rt
)
=
∑
t∈T
ai
a
Rt +
∑
u∈S
ruc
α
−
∑
u∈S
c(ru + λu)
α
(ai
a
)
=
∑
t∈T
ai
a
Rt +
∑
u∈S
ruc
α
(
1− ai
a
)
−
∑
u∈S
cλu
α
(ai
a
)
=
∑
t∈T
ai
a
Rt +
∑
u∈S
ruc
α
(a−i
a
)
−
∑
u∈S
cλu
α
(ai
a
)
=
∑
t∈T
ai
a
Rt,
Consequently, assuming i follows PPS + herding in GiM,T , we have:
U iM,T =
∑
t∈M/T
Rt +
∑
t∈T
ai
a
Rt
Having characterized the i’s value of any subgame GM,T under PPS + herding, we now need to show
that any deviation from it reduces agent i’s utility. This requires a more careful analysis as compared to
Theorem 3.1, as we need to account for all mixed strategies. Further, some of the subtasks in S could belong
to the set M \ T of i’s captive subtasks. For this, we define: Si = S ∩ T c, S−i = S ∩ T . Clearly agent i does
not choose any subtask in Si. Thus, the game GiM,T transitions to smaller subgames as follows:
• ∀u ∈ S−i : GiM,T → GM,T−u with probability suruα , GM−u,T−u with probability suλuα .
• ∀u′ ∈ Si : GiM,T → GM−u′,T with probability su′λu′α .
• ∀ v ∈ V : GiM,T → GM,T−v with probability svrvα .
From the expression we derive above for U iM,T , we have: U
i
M,T−u = U
i
M,T + Ru − aia Ru, U iM−u,T−u =
U iM,T − aia Ru, U iM−u′,T = U iM,T − Ru′ , U iM,T−v = U iM,T + Rv − aia Rv. Now we can characterize the utility
U i,devM,T of agent i in the case she deviates using the inductive assumption that in every smaller subgame,
agent i follows PPS + herding. We present only the main calculations here, as the reasoning follows the
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same lines as in the proof of Theorem 3.1:
U i,devM,T =
∑
u∈S−i
su(ru + λu)
α
(
ru
ru + λu
U iM,T−u +
λu
ru + λu
U iM−u,T−u
)
+
∑
u′∈Si
suλu
α
U iM−u,T +
∑
v∈V
svrv
α
U iM,T−v
=
∑
u∈S−i
su(ru + λu)
α
(
ru
ru + λu
(
U iM,T +Ru −
ai
a
Ru
)
+
λu
ru + λu
(
U iM,T −
ai
a
Ru
))
+
∑
u′∈Si
suλu
α
(
U iM,T −Ru
)
+
∑
v∈V
svrv
α
(
U iM,T +Rv −
ai
a
Rv
)
To complete the induction step, we need to show that U i,devM,T ≤ U iM,T . We have:
U i,devM,T − U iM,T =
∑
u∈S−i
su(ru + λu)
α
(
ru
ru + λu
(
Ru − ai
a
Ru
)
+
λu
ru + λu
(
−ai
a
Ru
))
+
∑
u′∈Si
suλu
α
(−Ru) +
∑
v∈V
svrv
α
(
Rv − ai
a
Rv
)
=
∑
u∈S−i
suru
α
a−i
a
Ru −
∑
u∈S−i
suλu
α
ai
a
Ru −
∑
u′∈Si
suλu
α
Ru +
∑
u∈V
svrv
α
a−i
a
Rv
Consider a subtask v ∈ V , one that agent i devotes attention to outside of S. One of the following
conditions has to be satisfied,
• v ∈Mo/S,
• ∃t ∈Mo such that v is reachable from t
In the former case, because of how we defined S, we have Rvsv < c. In the latter case, we have Rtst < c.
And, from the condition imposed in the hypothesis of the theorem, the fact that v is reachable from t implies
that Rvsv ≤ Rtst < c. Using this we can show that agent i does not benefit from deviation:
U i,devM,T − U iM,T <
a−i
aα
 ∑
u∈S−i
Rusuru +
∑
v∈V
Rvsvrv
− ai
aα
∑
u∈Si
Rusuλu +
∑
u∈S−i
Rusuλu

<
ca−i
aα
(∑
u∈Si
ru +
∑
v∈V
rv
)
− cai
aα
 ∑
u∈S−i
λu +
∑
u∈S−i
λu

=
ca−i
aα
(ai)− cai
aα
(a−i) = 0.
The fact that the resulting payoffs-vector is in the core follows from Theorem 6.2 in the Section 6 where
we characterize a sufficient condition for the same with general-aptitudes. This completes the proof.
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Note that in case of perfect proportional-allocation, agents are indifferent between all available subtasks
– thus herding no longer occurs in this setting.
Finally, as in linear subtask-networks, we can extend the above result to get conditions for PPS to be
the unique equilibrium as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Consider the Treasure-hunt game on a directed acyclic subtask-network G, and the SA model
with simplicities {su}u∈[m], and rewards {Ru}u∈[m]. Define ∀u ∈ [m], β ,
∑
i∈L ai, where L ∈ [n] is the set
of stackelberg players who commit to PPS ex-ante. Suppose the rewards-vector {Ru} satisfies the following
conditions:
• There exists a strict total ordering ≺ on subtasks [m] such that for every agent i and pair of subtasks
u, v, we have v ≺ u ⇐⇒ RusuRvsv >
a−i
β .
• For all pairs of subtasks (u, v) such that v is reachable from u in G, we have v ≺ u.
Then the following strategies together constitute a unique Nash equilibrium:
• Every agent implements the PPS policy.
• At any time, if Mo ⊆ [m] is the set of available subtasks, then every agent i chooses to work on the
unique subtask u∗ = arg maxu∈Mo Rusu
as long as agents in L do the above.
Proof. Given an agent i, we define GiM,T , (M,T ) ∈ S to be the subgame where agent i knows the solutions
to subtasks T c, while the Stackelberg agents j ∈ L knows the solutions to subtasks M c, i.e., M c is the set
of subtasks that have been publicly shared collectively. Note that T ⊆ M , and T c \M c are the captive
subtasks of i, i.e., those which i has solved, but not publicly shared. Also, for any set M such that M c ∈ C,
we define Mo ⊆M to be the available subtasks in M according to the dependencies in the graph.
We claim the following invariant: under the conditions specified in the theorem, PPS is a best response
for every agent i ∈ [n] \ L in every subgame GiM,T , (M,T ) ∈ S. Using notation from the proof of Theorem
3.1, we say subgame GiM,T ∈ Sl,k if (M,T ) ∈ Sl,k – note that this corresponds to agent i having k unsolved
subtasks, while the Stackelberg agents have l ≥ k unsolved subtasks. We can restate the above invariant
as follows – for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ m, and for all games GiM,T ∈ Sl,k, PPS is a best response for every agent
i ∈ [n] \ L.
For the base case, consider the set of subgames GiM,T ∈ S1,1, i.e., subgames where all agents have a single
open subtask. Clearly PPS is a best response for i in this case. For the inductive step, fixing (l, k), we
assume the invariant is true for all smaller subgames:
• GiM,T ∈ Sq,p where q < l and p ≤ k,
• GjM,T ∈ Sq,p where j 6= i, and q < l and p ≤ k.
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Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1, we need to prove two things assuming our invariant holds for smaller
games:
1. that “PPS” part of the invariant holds for subgames in Sl,k where k < l, and
2. given that (1) holds, we need to prove the “herding” condition holds for subgames of the type Sk,k.
We can prove (1) in a way similar way to the proof of Theorem 6.1. We will here prove (2). So effectively,
given that the invariant holds for all smaller games, and given “PPS”, we need to show that, for a given
agent i, his best response in the subgame GT,T is to choose the subtask u , u∗(T ). For simplicity of analysis,
assume there is just one agent j /∈ L ∪ {i} who is on some subtask w(possibly w = u).
In the scenario described above, let Ui(u) and Ui(v) denote the utility obtained by i when she chooses
subtask u and some v 6= u respectively. Following our usual notation, U iT,T represents i’s value of the
subgame GM,T under “PPS + herding”. From similar calculations we did earlier, we have that
U i(v)− U iT,T =
ai(v)
ai(v) + β(u) + aj(w)
a−i(v)
ai(v) + a−i(v)
Rv − β(u)
ai(v) + β(u) + ai(w)
ai(u)
ai(u) + a−i(u)
Ru
− aj(w)
ai(v) + β(u) + ai(w)
ai(w)
ai(w) + a−i(w)
Rw
≤ 1
ai(v) + β(u) + ai(w)
(
aia−i
ai + a−i
Rvsv − aiβ
ai + a−i
Rusu
)
≤ 0
U i(u)− U iT,T =
ai(u)
ai(u) + β(u) + aj(w)
a−i(u)
ai(u) + a−i(u)
Ru − β
ai(u) + β(u) + ai(w)
ai(u)
ai(u) + a−i(u)
Ru
− aj(w)
ai(u) + β(u) + ai(w)
ai(w)
ai(w) + a−i(w)
Rw
=
1
ai(u) + β(u) + aj(w)
(
aia−i
ai + a−i
Rusu − aiβ
ai + a−i
Rusu − aiaj
ai + a−i
Rwsw
)
=
1
ai(u) + β(u) + aj(w)
ai
ai + a−i
((a−i − β)Rusu − ajRwsw)
=
1
ai(u) + β(u) + aj(w)
ai
ai + a−i
(ajRusu − ajRwsw)
≥ 0
The above calculations show that U i(u) > U i(v) and that clinches the proof.
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4 The Efficiency of PPS in the Treasure-Hunt Game
Having obtained conditions for incentivizing PPS, we next turn to the problem of minimizing the expected
makespan of a multi-stage project. The importance of PPS is clear in linear subtask-networks, where ensuring
PPS is necessary and sufficient for minimizing the expected makespan. Essentially, under PPS, all agents
work together on a single current subtask, and thus each subtask gets solved at a rate equal to the sum of
rates of the agents. On the other hand, as we show in Example 2, in settings without PPS, each subtask is
solved at a rate close to that of the maximum single-agent rate.
An ideal result would be if ensuring PPS alone is sufficient to minimize makespan in all acyclic subtask-
networks. However the following example shows this is not possible:
Example 3. Consider a treasure-hunt game with m parallel subtasks and m agents. We index agents and
subtasks with unique labels from [m]. Suppose the aptitudes are given by: ai(u) = 1 if i = u, else 1/(m− 1).
From Theorem 3.1, we know that we can set rewards so as to ensure that all agents follow PPS + herding,
i.e., they solve the subtasks as a group in a fixed order. Thus we have that E[TPPS ] = m1+(m−1)/(m−1) = m/2.
On the other hand, suppose agent i starts on task u = i, and stops after finishing it – clearly this is an upper
bound on the optimal makespan, and so we have E[TOPT ] = 1m +
1
m−1 + . . .+ 1 = Θ(logm).
Thus, in the equilibrium wherein all agents follow PPS, the expected makespan is greater than the optimal
by a multiplicative factor of Ω(m/ logm). Conversely, however, we can show that this is in fact the worst
possible ratio up to a logarithmic factor:
Theorem 4.1. Given an acyclic subtask-network G with edge set [m], suppose the rewards-vector satisfy the
conditions in Theorem 3.1. Then the expected makespan of the corresponding equilibrium where all agents
follow PPS is no worse than m times the optimal makespan, irrespective of the number of agents.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. As in the proof of Theorem 4.2, given subtask-network G, we define V as the set of
valid knowledge-subgraphs. Further, for any M ⊆ [m] with M c ∈ V, we defined Mo ⊆ M to be the set of
available tasks.
Let OPT denote the optimal centralized agent-subtask allocation algorithm. In particular, for any
subgame GM (i.e.,wherein solutions for all subtasks in knowledge-subgraph M c ∈ V are public), OPT
chooses the agent-subtask distribution matrix {xOPTi (u)}i∈[n],u∈Mo that minimizes the expected makespan
of the remaining subtasks. Let TOPT (M) denote the expected time achieved by OPT in subgame GM , and
for each subtask u ∈Mo, let λOPTu =
∑
i∈[n] x
OPT
i (u)ai(u).
For any arbitrary work-conserving strategy {xi(u)}u∈Mo , with corresponding λu, we claim that subgame
GM reduces to the subgame GM−u with probability λu∑
u∈Mo λu
, after an expected time of 1∑
u∈Mo λu
. This
25
follows from standard properties of the exponential distribution. Thus, we have:
E[TOPT (M)] =
1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
+
∑
u∈Mo
λOPTu∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
E[TOPT (M − u)] (1)
This follows from the linearity of expectation, and the fact that OPT chooses the optimal agent-subtask
distribution in each subgame.
For a given subgame-network with subtasks M , we define the herding-time as:
TH(M) =
∑
u∈M
1
a(u)
. (2)
where a(u) ,
∑
i∈[n] ai(u).
Assuming the rewards-vector satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.1, the makespan achieved by the
resulting equilibrium is exactly TH(M). Let Sk = {GM : M c ∈ V, |M | = k} be the set of all valid subgames
with k remaining subtasks, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. We now claim the following invariant: for every subgraph
M ∈ Sk, we have E[TOPT (M)] ≥ 1kTH(M).
We now prove the above invariant via induction. For k = 1, the invariant is trivially, since the subgames
in S1 have only a single subtask left. Now assume the invariant is true for ∀M ∈ Sl, l ≤ k. Consider a
subgame M ∈ Sk+1. Applying the induction hypothesis, we have ∀u ∈Mo,E[TOPT (M−u)] ≥ 1kTH(M−u).
Now from equations 1 and 2, we have for TOPT :
E[TOPT (M)] =
1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
+
∑
u∈Mo
[
λOPTu∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
E[TOPT (M − u)]
]
≥ 1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
+
1
k
∑
u∈Mo
[
λOPTu∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
TH(M − u)
]
=
1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
+
1
k
∑
u∈Mo
[
λOPTu∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
(
TH(M)− 1
a(u)
)]
=
1
k
TH(M) +
1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
[
1− 1
k
∑
u∈Mo
λOPTu
a(u)
]
.
Using c(u) , λ
OPT
u
a(u) , and equation 1 we get:
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E[TOPT (M)]
TH(M)
≥ 1
k
+
1(∑
u∈Mo
1
a(u)
) (∑
u∈Mo c(u)a(u)
)
[
1− 1
k
∑
u∈Mo
c(u)
]
=
1
k
+
∑
u∈Mo c(u)(∑
u∈Mo
1
a(u)
) (∑
u∈Mo c(u)a(u)
)
[
1∑
u∈Mo c(u)
− 1
k
]
Because 0 ≤ c(u) ≤ 1 and |Mo| ≤ k + 1, we have
∑
u∈Mo c(u) ≤ k + 1, and consequently:
E[TOPT (M)]
TH(M)
≥ 1
k
+
∑
u∈Mo c(u)(∑
u∈Mo
1
a(u)
) (∑
u∈Mo c(u)a(u)
) [ 1k + 1 − 1k
]
≥ 1
k
+
[
1
k + 1
− 1
k
]
=
1
k + 1
.
This completes the inductive argument, and hence the proof.
Recall in Example 2, we show that the expected makespan without PPS can be greater by an Ω(n) factor.
Theorem 4.1 shows that under PPS, the makespan can be off by a factor depending on the number of tasks,
but not the number of agents. This is significant in large collaborative projects, where the number of agents
often far exceeds the number of tasks. Moreover, under the SA model, we get a surprising optimality result:
Theorem 4.2. Given any acyclic subtask-network G under the SA model, with edge set [m] and agents [n].
Then any corresponding equilibrium where all agents follow PPS also minimizes the expected makespan.
In particular, setting rewards to satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3.2 minimizes the makespan. We now
look at the proof of this result.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. As before, given subtask-network G, we define V as the set of valid knowledge-
subgraphs. Further, for any M ⊆ [m] with M c ∈ V, we defined Mo ⊆ M to be the set of available
tasks. Let OPT denote the optimal centralized agent-subtask allocation algorithm. In particular, for any
subgame GM (i.e.,wherein solutions for all subtasks in knowledge-subgraph M c ∈ V are public), OPT chooses
the agent-subtask distribution matrix {xOPTi (u)}i∈[n],u∈Mo that minimizes the expected makespan of the re-
maining subtasks. Let TOPT (M) denote the expected time achieved by OPT in subgame GM , and for each
subtask u ∈Mo, let λOPTu =
∑
i∈[n] x
OPT
i (u)ai.
On the other hand, assuming the rewards-vector satisfies the conditions for PPS, let TPPS(GM ) denote
the makespan achieved by some chosen equilibrium state in subgame GM . Also, as we did for OPT , we
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define {xeqi (u)}i∈[n],u∈Mo (and λequ =
∑
i∈[n] x
eq
i (u)ai) to be the agent-subtask distribution matrix for some
equilibrium state.
For any arbitrary work-conserving strategy {xi(u)}u∈Mo , with corresponding λu, we claim that subgame
GM reduces to the subgame GM−u with probability λusu∑
u∈Mo λusu
, after an expected time of 1∑
u∈Mo λusu
. This
follows from the SA model, and also standard properties of the exponential distribution. Thus, we have:
E[TOPT (M)] =
1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u su
+
∑
u∈Mo
λOPTu su∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u su
E[TOPT (M − u)] (3)
E[TPPS(GM )] = 1∑
u∈Mo λ
eq
u su
+
∑
u∈Mo
λequ su∑
u∈Mo λ
eq
u su
E[TPPS(GM−u)]. (4)
The first follows from linearity of expectation, and the property that OPT chooses the optimal agent-subtask
distribution in each subgame; the second follows from the subgame-perfect property of the equilibrium.
For a given subgame-network with subtasks M , we define the herding-time TH(M) =
∑
u∈M
1
Asu
, where
A =
∑
i∈[n] ai. We now claim the following invariant: for every subgraph M with M
c ∈ V, we have
E[TPPS(GM )] = E[TOPT (M)] = TH(M). Since this is true for all subgames GM , therefore we have that the
price-of-anarchy is 1 for all acyclic subtask networks under the SA model.
We now prove the above invariant via induction. Let Sk = {GM : M c ∈ V, |M | = k} be the set
of all valid subgames with k remaining subtasks, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. For k = 1, the invariant is trivially,
since the subgames in S1 have only a single subtask left. Now assume the invariant is true for ∀M ∈ Sl,
l ≤ k. Consider a subgame M ∈ Sk+1. Applying the induction hypothesis to equations 3 and 4, we have
∀u ∈Mo,E[TOPT (M − u)] = E[TPPS(GM−u)] = TH(M − u). Now from equation 3, we have for TOPT :
E[TOPT (M)] =
1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u su
+
∑
u∈Mo
[
λOPTu su∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u su
E[TH(M − u)]
]
=
1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u su
+
∑
u∈Mo
[
λOPTu su∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u su
(
E[TH(M)]− 1
Asu
)]
.
Simplifying this expression, we get:
E[TOPT (M)] = E[TH(M)] +
1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u su
− 1∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u su
(∑
u∈Mo λ
OPT
u
A
)
= E[TH(M)].
Similarly, we can do the same for TPPS , using equation 4 and the induction hypothesis. Combining the two,
we get the desired result.
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5 Discussion
As mentioned in Section 1, in a stylized model like ours, some phenomena may arise from modeling artifacts.
We now briefly argue that our results are mostly insensitive to our assumptions.
We focus on a setting with compulsory participation – agents derive utility only by solving subtasks. A
vast majority of research is done by professional researchers, committed to working on their chosen topics,
which makes the act of research different from settings such as crowdsourcing [6]. Moreover, our results are
not sensitive to the number of researchers engaged in a project – the question of partial-progress sharing
arises as soon as there is more than one participant.
We assume that the time an agent takes to solve a task has an exponential distribution. Such an as-
sumption is common when considering dynamics in games as it helps simplify the analysis (for example,
see [9]). We conjecture however that the equilibria in the treasure-hunt game remain qualitatively similar
under a much broader class of distributions. One reason for this is that assuming exponentially distributed
completion times is, in a sense, over-optimistic. For an agent trying to decide whether or not to share a
breakthrough, assuming memoryless completion times essentially corresponds to assuming other agents are
starting from scratch, discounting any time already invested in the problem.
We assume that agents work on tasks independently. This allows us to focus on information sharing.
However, as discussed in Section 2.3, our results extend to give conditions for the payoffs-vector resulting
from everyone following PPS to be in the core. This might not work if coalitions have rates which are
super-additive. Essentially, for PPS to be in the core, we only need the grand coalition to have the fastest
rate among all coalitions (see Corollary 2).
Partial-progress sharing is one of several primitives required for enabling true collaborative research.
However, there are very few good formal ways for reasoning about such settings. The model we develop
for studying information sharing in collaborative research, though stylized, exhibits a variety of phenomena
which correspond to observed behavior among researchers. It captures the uncertain dynamics of research,
while retaining analytic tractability. Although we focus on understanding incentives for PPS, our model
may prove useful for understanding other related questions.
6 Additional theorems
Theorem 6.1. Define ∀u ∈ [m], β(u) , ∑i∈L ai(u), where L ∈ [n] is the set of stackelberg players who
commit to PPS ex-ante. Suppose the rewards-vector {Ru} satisfies the following: for any agent i ∈ [n] \ L
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and for any pair of subtasks u, v such that u precedes v, the rewards satisfy:
Ruβ(u)
Rva−i(v)
≥ ai(v)
ai(v) + a−i(v)
,
where for any task w, we define a−i(w) ,
∑
j 6=i aj(w). Then all agents following partial-progress sharing
(PPS) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We number the subtasks from the end, with the last subtask being denoted as 1, and the first as m.
Fix an agent i ∈ [n] and define Gik,l, 0 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ m, to be the subgame where agent i starts at subtask k, and
the Stackelberg agents L start at subtask l. And we formulate the following invariant: under the conditions
specified in the theorem, PPS is a best response for every agent j ∈ [n] in every subgame Gjk,l, 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ m.
Given two subgames Gjp,q and Gik,l, we say that Gjp,q is smaller than Gik,l if:
• i = j ∧ (p < k ∨ (p = k ∧ q < l)), or
• i 6= j ∧ q < l.
Given a subgame Gik,l, assuming the above-mentioned invariant is true for all smaller subgames, agent i
is certain that there is no other agent ahead of her. For, if there were an agent j ahead of her at subtask
r < k, agent j would follow PPS by virtue of being in a smaller game.
And so, the expected reward earned by agent i by following PPS in the subgame Gik,l is given by:
U ik,l =
l∑
u=k+1
Ru +
k∑
u=1
Ru.
(
ai(u)
ai(u) + a−i(u)
)
,
where a−i(u) =
∑
j∈[n]\{i} aj(u).
As discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.1, given a subgame Gik,l, we need only show that, for agent i
following PPS dominates one step deviations, i.e., waiting to progress to subtask k − 1 before sharing any
progress (unless, as we have by the invariant, some other agent who is behind declares some progress).
Assume that agent i is deviating as explained above. For any strategy profile of agents in [n] \ (L∪ {i}),
let pk−1 and pl′ denote the probabilities that Gik,l devolves to Gik−1,k−1 and Gik,l′ , where k ≤ l′ < l, when any
of the above agents declares progress upto a subgame between l and k− 1. Since the invariant dictates that
i will follow PPS in each of these subgames, the game transitions to Gjk,k for all j ∈ [n]. And the first agent
j′ to make progress will move to Gj′k−1,k, and by the invariant will follow PPS. So effectively, assuming the
invariant ensures that every agent follows PPS in the ensuing subgame. So the reward gained by agent i in
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Gik,l′ is:
U ik,l′ =
l′∑
u=k+1
Ru +
k∑
u=1
Ru.
(
ai(u)
ai(u) + a−i(u)
)
≤ U ik,l−1 < U ik−1,l. (5)
And similarly,
U ik−1,k−1 < U
i
k,l−1. (6)
Summing up, since the Stackelberg agents L are on subtask l in Gik,l, we have that Gik,l transitions to:
• Gik−1,k−1 with probability pk−1,
• Gik−1,l with probability ai(k)β(l)+ai(k) (1− p),
• Gik,l′ with probability pl′ , for k ≤ l′ < l − 1, and
• Gik,l−1 with probability pl−1 + β(l)β(l)+ai(k) (1− p),
where p ,
∑
k−1≤l′<l pl′ .
From the above arguments, and using equations (5,6) we have that:
U i,devk,l = pk−1U
i
k−1,k−1 +
ai(k)
β(l) + ai(k)
(1− p)U ik−1,l +
∑
k≤l′<l−1
pl′U
i
k,l′ +
(
pl +
β(l)
β(l) + ai(k)
(1− p)
)
U ik,l−1,
≤ pU ik,l−1 + (1− p)
(
ai(k)
β(l) + ai(k)
U ik−1,l +
β(l)
β(l) + ai(k)
U ik,l−1
)
,
≤ ai(k)
β(l) + ai(k)
U ik−1,l +
β(l)
β(l) + ai(k)
U ik,l−1,
=
ai(k)
β(l) + ai(k)
(
U ik,l +Rk −
ai(k)
ai(k) + a−i(k)
Rk
)
+
β(l)
β(l) + ai(k)
(
U ik,l −Rl
)
,
= U ik,l +
ai(k)
β(l) + ai(k)
a−i(k)
ai(k) + a−i(k)
Rk − β(l)
β(l) + ai(k)
Rl.
Subtracting this from the expected utility under PPS, we get:
U ik,l − U i,devk,l ≥
β(l)
β(l) + ai(k)
Rl − ai(k)
β(l) + ai(k)
a−i(k)
ai(k) + a−i(k)
Rk
=
a−i(k)Rk
β(l) + ai(k)
(
β(l)Rl
a−i(k)Rk
− ai(k)
ai(k) + a−i(k)
)
≥ 0
The proof follows from a backward induction argument, since the stated invariant is true for all subgames
of the form Gi0,l (and Gi1,1) for all i ∈ [n].
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Theorem 6.2. Consider the Treasure-hunt game on a directed acyclic subtask-network G, and a general
agent-subtask aptitude matrix {ai(u)}. Suppose the rewards-vector {Ru} satisfies the following conditions:
• (Monotonicity) There exists a total ordering ≺ on subtasks [m] such that for every agent i and pair of
subtasks u, v, we have v ≺ u ⇐⇒ Rvai(v) < Ruai(u).
• For all pairs of subtasks (u, v) such that v is reachable from u in G, we have v ≺ u.
Then the following strategies together constitute a Nash equilibrium:
• Every agent implements the PPS policy.
• At any time, if Mo ⊆ [m] is the set of available subtasks, then every agent i chooses to work on the
unique subtask u∗ = arg maxu∈Mo Ruai(u)
More importantly, the corresponding payoffs are in the core.
Proof. Clearly, the condition on rewards required above is a special case of the more general condition in
Theorem 3.1. Therefore, “PPS + herding” constitutes a Nash equilibrium. For each agent i ∈ [n], the
corresponding payoff is given by: ui ,
∑
u∈[m]
ai(u)
ai(u)+a−i(u)
Ru.
Given a coalition C ⊂ [n], let ν(C) denote the value of the game for C. Define ∀u ∈ [m], aC(u) ,∑
i∈C ai(u) and a−C(u) ,
∑
i∈[n]\C ai(u). By the standard properties of exponential random variables, any
strategy profile of agents in C, i.e., which task each agent works on, can be thought of a mixed strategy of
a single player of ability {aC(u)}u∈[m].
Assume every agent in [n] \ C does “PPS + herding”. By the monotonicity condition, we have,
Rvai(v) < Ruai(u) =⇒ RvaC(v) < RuaC(u) and Rva−C(v) < Rua−C(u)
=⇒ RvaC(v)a−C(v)
aC(v) + a−C(v)
<
RuaC(u)a−C(u)
aC(u) + a−C(u)
.
By Theorem 3.1, “PPS + herding” is a best response for C. The payoff obtained by C in this scenario is
∑
u∈[m]
aC(u)
aC(u) + a−C(u)
Ru =
∑
i∈C
∑
u∈[m]
ai(u)
ai(u) + a−i(u)
Ru =
∑
i∈C
ui.
Therefore, ν(C) ≤∑i∈C ui, and the result follows.
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